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Legislative Response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
The author explores and surveys the legislative response to Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily. While it is recognized that the debate and controversy is
far from over, the resulting legislation, including the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980, is viewed as being a significant contribution to the area of
fourth amendment law. The author analyzes the applicable legislation in
detail.
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment1 limits the states' power to search and
arrest by prohibiting "unreasonable" searches and seizures. 2 It is
well established in fourth amendment case law that with few ex-
ceptions, a search or arrest is unreasonable unless it is based
upon probable cause.3
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. The first part of the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures; the second requires that probable cause be shown before a warrant
can issue. There has been considerable debate over when a warrant is required
for a search to be constitutional. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
the Court held that law enforcement officials had a right to conduct a warrantless
search of a person incident to lawful arrest. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925), the Court extended Weeks to include a warrantless search of whatever
is found on a person or in his control incident to a lawful arrest. Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) established that enforcement officials could search the
person and the place where the arrest is made. However, in Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) the Court held that law enforcement officials must se-
cure and use search warrants whenever reasonably possible. Subsequently, the
Court rejected Trupiano and held that the test was whether the search was rea-
sonable, not whether it was reasonable to procure a search warrant in United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). The matter was further complicated in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the Court held that whenever practical, po-
lice must get advance judicial approval in the form of a warrant in order to con-
duct a search. Finally, in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court held
that a search incident to a lawful arrest must be limited to the person of the ac-
cused and the area from within which he might obtain either a weapon or some-
thing that could be used as evidence against him.
3. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963). "Unfortunately
there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." Camara v. Mun.
Court 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,4 the United States Supreme Court
ruled five to three that the fourth amendment does not prevent or
restrict the execution of search warrants to search for and seize
evidence in the custody of parties not themselves suspected of
criminal activities, even when the third party is a newspaper or
media institution.5 The Court made no distinction between sus-
pects and innocent parties when determining the criteria for the
probable cause needed for an enforcement official to obtain a war-
rant to search.6 By so ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the
district court's and court of appeals' rulings which had made a
distinction between suspects and innocent parties.7 The lower
courts in Stanford Daily argued that a distinction should be made
between intrusions upon innocent individuals and intrusions
upon suspects. This rationale was based on the premise that the
fourth amendment affords greater protection to innocent individu-
als against searches and seizures than it affords to suspects. 8
However, the Supreme Court refused to accept this interpretation
of the fourth amendment, ruling instead that magistrates need
not distinguish between suspects and innocent parties when issu-
ing warrants to search and seize.9
The Stanford Daily decision has received considerable criticism
from scholars, legislators, and the press since it was announced
on May 31, 1978. Most of the criticism has been directed toward
the Court's approval of the issuance of search warrants to search
for evidence possessed by innocent third parties, including news-
paper and media agencies.10
4. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
5. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the
Daily case.
6. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, stated: 'The critical element in
a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched
for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought." 436 U.S. at
556 (1978).
7. 353 F. Supp. 124, (N.D. Cal. 1972). "[T]he Court holds that third parties are
entitled to greater protection, particularly when First Amendment interests are in-
volved." Id. at 127.
8. Id. A search of a third party for materials in his possession is unreasona-
ble and violative of the fourth amendment unless there is proper cause to believe
the materials will be destroyed or a subpoena duces tecum is impractical.
9. "[C ourts may not, in the name of Fourth Amendment reasonableness,
prohibit the States from issuing warrants to search for evidence simply because
the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not then reasonably sus-
pected of criminal involvement." 436 U.S. at 560.
10. An editorial in the N.Y. Times, June 6, 1978, § A at 16, Col. 1, began: "The
privacy rights of the lawabiding were shabbily treated by the Supreme Court
...."; As one commentator noted: "The decision has produced an outpouring of
shock and dismay unprecedented in modern journalism." Citizens Privacy Protec-
tion Act: Hearings on S.3162 and S.3164 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
[Vol. 9: 131, 19811 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
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Criticism materialized into legislation. Many bills were intro-
duced in Congress and went for mark up before the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees.11 The intent of this legislation was
to supersede the minimum standard of probable cause set down
by the Stanford Daily decision. Remedial legislation placed a
new requirement for probable cause where the person believed to
have the evidence is in no way connected with the crime, particu-
larly with respect to newspaper and media personnel and
facilities.12
Essentially the legislation served to reestablish the probable
cause distinction developed by the lower courts. To ensure that
third parties not suspected of any connection with the crime
would receive greater protections from searches than a suspect,
legislation proposed to adopt and implement a "subpoena first
rule." The objective of the "subpoena first rule" was to require
that the "less intrusive means" of a subpoena be utilized, unless
reasonable cause was shown that a subpoena would result in the
danger that the evidence would be destroyed, removed from the
premises, or otherwise become unobtainable.' 3
of the Senate Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1978) (statement of Robert Lewis)
(hereinafter cited as Privacy).
The outcry over Stanford Daily did not come only from journalists. Many pri-
vate organizations, the most vocal of which was the American Civil Liberties
Union, expressed strong concern that the Court's interpretation of the fourth
amendment threatened not only the interests of the press, but also opened the
door for widespread intrusions on the privacy interests of all citizens. "The Stan-
ford Daily decision is but another step-perhaps the most dangerous and far-
reaching-in a series of recent Supreme Court decisions weakening the privacy
rights of American citizens." Taken by surprise: The Implications of Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily for the News Media and the Public: REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
STATE ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CODES 35 (1978) (testimony of Norman Dorsen, Na-
tional Chairman of the ACLU).
11. Inter alia, Congressman Dan Quayle introduced the "Citizen Protection
Act of 1979," H.R. 13017; Congressman Jacobs introduced the "Third Party Search
Protection Act of 1978," H.R. 13113; Congressman Edwards introduced the "Citizen
Privacy Protection Amendments," H.R. 13227; Congressman Drinan introduced the
"Press Protection Act of 1978," H.R. 12952; Congressman Railsback introduced his
version of the "Press Protection Act of 1978," H.R. 13232. This is only a cross sec-
tion of some of the bills that were introduced. For a more extensive listing, see
Note, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: The Legislative Debate, 17 HAv. J. LEGIS. 152, 154
(1980) (hereinafter The Legislative Debate).
12. As stated by Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, the representative for the
Stanford University area, who served on the Republican Task Force on the Stan-
ford Daily decision, "The essence of this legislation is that no innocent person
should be the subject of a search warrant." San Francisco Chronicle, August 18,
1978, § 1, at 13, Col. 2.
13. Additional views of Senator Orrin Hatch and Alan Simpson: "We are in
The application of the subpoena first policy was incorporated in
two types of Bills: "Work Product" and "Third Party." The work
product bills focused on shielding sources of public information
dissemination (e.g., authors, newspapers, and media associa-
tions). Work product legislation required that the "subpoena first
rule" be employed when law enforcement officials seek to secure
evidence possessed by a person believed to have a purpose to dis-
seminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other
similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce.14 Since the work product regulation pertained
specifically to public communication in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, the congressional authority to enforce the
"subpoena first rule" on state and local levels was based on Arti-
cle I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution, i.e., the Com-
merce Clause.' 5
Third party bills focused on shielding all innocent third parties.
They did not differentiate between work product and non-work
product evidence. Third party legislation required that the "sub-
poena first rule" be employed in all instances unless there was
reasonable cause to believe that the person in control of the evi-
dence was affiliated with the crime or that the evidence might be
destroyed. 16 Due to the breadth of coverage furnished by third
party bills, they did not satisfy the requisite of "affecting inter-
state commerce" sufficiently to base congressional authority to
legislate on the Commerce Clause. Therefore, third party bills re-
lied on the congressional authority accorded by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the fourteenth amendment, specifically,
Section 5, which grants Congress the power to enforce the provi-
effect saying that, especially when communication to the public is involved, sub-
poenas should be used except in certain very limited circumstances." SENATE
COMM. ON THE JuDicmRy, Privacy Protection Act of 1980, S. REP. No. 874, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [19801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3950 [hereinaf-
ter S. REP. No. 874).
14. President Carter announced that he would "propose legislation that would
restrict police intrusion into news media offices, and would give members of the
press notice and opportunity to challenge requests for the products of their report-
ing work." 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2234 (Dec. 18, 1978).
15. "When the materials sought consist of work product.., the title applies to
state, local, and federal law enforcement officers. Because disseminating informa-
tion regularly affects interstate commerce, congressional authority to regulate
state and local enforcement in this statute is based on the commerce clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8." S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 9, reprinted at 3956.
16. "[Alttention coming out of the Stanford case has, with some justification,
primarily centered on safeguarding the press. This Task Force, however, is seri-
ously concerned over the First and Fourth Amendment implications for all citi-
zens, not only the press." Report of the Republican Task Force on the Stanford
Daily decision (August 17, 1978).
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sion of the amendment "by appropriate legislation. ' '17
Eventually, through the compromise of the legislative process, a
bill emerged from Conference Committee which was an amalga-
mation of work product and third party bills. The legislation was
titled "The Privacy Protection Act of 1980," and it was signed into
law by President Carter on October 13, 1980.18 As applicable to
state and local levels, the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 is prima-
rily a work product bill. However, the Act also protects third par-
ties not associated with work product through the regulation of
federal law enforcement officers. 19 Hesitant to base the congres-
sional authority to legislate on state and local levels on Section 5
of the fourteenth amendment, legislators chose to word the Pri-
vacy Protection Act so that the constitutional question of congres-
sional authority would rest solely on the Commerce Clause 2O and
the right to regulate federal officers.21
Although the Privacy Protection Act does provide for the pro-
tection of third parties, exactly what third parties are to be pro-
tected is, as yet, unestablished. The Act mandates the Attorney
General to develop guidelines for the protection of third parties
beyond those associated with work product (e.g., confidential doc-
tor/patient and lawyer/client relationships). However, the guide-
lines themselves are relatively unspecific and there is no doubt
their application will be largely left to the discretion of the Attor-
17. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to thejurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws .... Section 5, The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the article.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
18. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980). For
further discussion see note 13 supra at 4, where it is stated that: this Act
"[Alffords the press and certain other persons not suspected of committing a
crime with protections not provided currently by the Fourth Amendment. This
legislation was prompted by Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) .... "
19. Privacy Protection Act of 1080, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879, 1882 (1980).
"The Attorney General shall, within six months of date of enactment of this Act,
issue guidelines for the procedures to be employed by any Federal officer or em-
ployee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of an offense, to obtain
documentary materials .... " Id.
20. "The Congress shall have power to regulate Commerce with foreign na-
tions, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8.
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
ney General.22
In application, the Privacy Protection Act is similar to a "paint
by numbers" painting. Although the diagram is complete, the
outline clear, and the colors labelled; actually the final discretion
of which hue to use, or perhaps whether to finish the painting at
all, is up to the painter. Considering the recent change in Admin-
istrations, the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 is far from complete
and full of uncertainty. This comment will review the procession
of legislation in response to the Zurcher v. Stanford Daily deci-
sion up to the culmination of the Privacy Protection Act of 1980.
Hopefully, some of the present uncertainty as to the future appli-
cations of the Privacy Protection Act can be eliminated through a
thorough understanding of legislative intent.
I. BACKGROUND OF STANFORD DAILY
On April 7, 1971, a group of Stanford University students held
an anti-war demonstration in the administrative offices of the
Stanford University Hospital. Hospital administrators resorted to
calling the police for help in removing the demonstrators. Al-
though the police efforts were peaceful at first, officers finally de-
cided to force their way through barricaded doors. As officers
entered the corridors, a group of demonstrators ran to the other
end of the corridor attacking and injuring nine officers. Only two
of the demonstrators could be identified.
On April 11, 1971, the Stanford Daily, the campus newspaper,
published photographs of the incident indicating that a staff pho-
tographer had been in the corridor where he could have photo-
graphed the attack on the officers. The following day, the police
obtained a warrant for an "immediate search" of the Stanford
Daily's offices for negatives, film, and pictures of the incident.
The warrant was issued on the belief that photographic evidence
relevant to the assaults would be found at the offices of the news-
paper. The warrant affidavit did not allege that staff members of
the Stanford Daily had been involved in any unlawful acts.
A search pursuant to this warrant was conducted later that
22. Privacy Protection Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980). See
also, S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 18, reprinted at 3965, where the committee
states that they have
proposed and the Department [of Justice] had agreed to a legislative man-
date that the Department develop guidelines which will be based on the
overall philosophy of this legislation. The invasion of personal privacy re-
sulting from an unannounced search of nonsuspect third parties requires
stringent measures to limit the circumstances under which such searches
can be conducted. It is the intent of the Committee that the guidelines
promulgated by the Attorney General should reflect these concerns.
Id.
[Vol. 9: 131, 1981] Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
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day.23 The search lasted about fifteen minutes and encompassed
the photo lab, filing cabinets, wastebaskets, and unlocked desks.
Newspaper staff claimed that among the papers inspected were
notes containing information given in confidence by informants.24
Only the published photographs were found and the officers re-
moved nothing from the office. 25
One month later, the Stanford Daily brought an action for de-
claratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983,26 al-
leging the violation of rights guaranteed by the first, fourth, and
fourteenth amendments. The Stanford Daily argued that the po-
lice should have asked the prosecutor to issue a subpoena for the
photos or should have obtained a court order that any evidence
found in the paper's possession would not be destroyed.27 The
district court granted declaratory relief, holding that the search of
the Stanford Daily was unreasonable because a warrant was is-
sued without a showing of probable cause that a subpoena duces
tecum would be "impractical." 28 The court's reasoning was that
innocent third parties (those not suspected of a crime) are enti-
tled to a greater protection under the fourth amendment than
those who are suspected of criminal activity, especially when the
object of the search is a newspaper or media institution.29 On ap-
23. The search warrant was executed at approximately 5:45 p.m. that same day
(April 12, 1971) by four members of the Palo Alto Police Department.
24. Officers claimed that they did not read or even scan the materials. 353 F.
Supp. at 127.
25. Id. Negatives and fim used while taking pictures at Stanford University
Hospital on April 9, 1971, showing the sit-in and following events were also in-
cluded in the search warrant, but were not found by the officers.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
27. The Stanford Daily and the members of its staff brought a civil rights ac-
tion seeking declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to searches of the news-
paper premises. 353 F. Supp. at 125-26.
28. Id. at 127.
It is the Court's belief that unless the Magistrate has before him a sworn
affidavit establishing proper cause to believe that the materials in ques-
tion will be destroyed, or that a subpoena duces tecum is otherwise im-
practical, a search of a third party for materials in his possession is
unreasonable per se, and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
29. Id. at 130. The Court believed that "in all but a few instances a subpoena
duces tecum is the proper-and required-method of obtaining material from a
peal to the Ninth Circuit, the court of appeals affirmed per
curiam, adopting the district court's opinion.30 Again on appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed by a vote of five to three.31
II. CRITERIA FOR PROBABLE CAUSE
The principle of the Stanford Daily case rests upon the
Supreme Court's determination of the standard of probable cause
which must be adhered to by the lower courts when considering
the issuance of a search warrant.32 The Supreme Court chose to
cite the accepted standard for probable cause as applicable in the
Stanford Daily case, whereas the lower courts chose to cite a new
requirement of a "subpoena first" policy for innocent third par-
ties. The disparity between these respective rationales is the is-
sue which Congress has chosen to act upon.33
A. The Accepted Probable Cause Standard
In order for a search or arrest to be constitutional, the state
must satisfy three basic elements.34 To justify an intrusion upon
an individual, the state must show probable cause to believe that:
third party." Id. at 130-32. The Court's reasons included the value our society
places on privacy, the notion that search warrants have historically involved only
those suspected of a crime, the idea that without the requirement that enforce-
ment agencies first explore the subpoena alternative in third party situations "a
third party would receive no meaningful protection against an unlawful search
.", and finally the holding of Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971),
which stated that a material witness cannot be arrested or detained unless a sub-
poena is impractical. The Stanford Daily Court felt that this analysis should be
applied to third party searches as well. 353 F. Supp. at 132.
30. The court rejected appellants' arguments that one, "the issuing magistrate
is the sole proper party defendant" and two, that "good faith in securing what
turned out to be an invalid warrant insulates them from liability." Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464, 465 (9th Cir. 1977).
31. Id. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist
joined Justice White's majority opinion.
32. See note 3 supra. The probable cause standard which the Court followed
was to balance the need to search against the invasion which will result. Camara
v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Further, the Court defined what information is
necessary to establish probable cause as: "[Elvidence which would 'Warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief' that a felony has been committed ......
Wong Sun v. United States, 311 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
33. 436 U.S. at 549-50, 554, 560-63 (1978). The Supreme Court characterized the
district court's construction of the fourth amendment as an unfounded reconstruc-
tion. Id. at 554: "It is an understatement to say that there is no direct authority in
this or any other federal court for the District Court's sweeping revision of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 560: "(T]he reasons presented by the District Court
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for arriving at its remarkable conclusion do
not withstand analysis." Id.
34. A general probable cause standard is discussed in various cases on the
subject. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to
lawful arrest); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (custodial searches of im-
pounded or seized property).
138
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(1) a crime has been committed; (2) that specific evidence of the
crime exists; and (3) that the evidence will be found in a particu-
lar location.35
A division of these elements reveals the disagreement between
the Supreme Court and the lower courts. The first two elements
of the accepted standard can be grouped together, and, as such,
they require the state to show probable cause that a piece of evi-
dence exists before it can search. But, under the third element,
once the state has probable cause to believe that such an object of
evidence does exist, it must then show probable cause that an in-
trusion will secure that object before it can search or arrest.36
The third element weighs the state's need to secure the evidence
against the individual's right to privacy.37 It is the balancing be-
tween the state's interest and the individual's interest upon which
the courts disagree.
Justice White, writing for the majority, explained the reasoning
for the standard cited by the Supreme Court in Stanford Daily:
"The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner
of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable
cause to believe that specific 'things' to be searched for and
seized are located on the property to which entry is sought." 38
Thus, the accepted standard treats innocent persons and suspects
who are probable possessors of evidence exactly alike. Therefore,
it is the state's interest in the evidence presumed to be on the
person or property that governs the third element of the accepted
standard. A person's lack of knowledge of the crime, or willing-
ness to bring forward the evidence sought has no bearing on the
issuance of the search warrant whatsoever.39
35. These elements are derived from varying statements of separate opinions.
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479, 481 n.9 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102-03 (1959); Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925).
36. 371 U.S. 471, 481 n.9 (1963) (the complaint for a search warrant must partic-
ularly describe the things to be seized).
37. The state's interest in the object to be seized is determined by whether the
object will assist the state in apprehending a suspect or in obtaining a conviction
of a defendant at trial. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 (1967).
38. 436 U.S. at 556.
39. Id. at 555. "[TJhe State's interest in enforcing the criminal law and recov-
ering evidence is the same whether the third party is culpable or not .... " Id.
B. An Additional Requirement for Probable Cause
The district court found the standard application of probable
cause to innocent third parties insufficient. Therefore, the court
expanded the accepted standard for probable cause by adding an
additional requirement for innocent third parties, particularly
newspaper and media institutions.40 This additional requirement
was termed a "subpoena first rule." The district court opinion
was that a warrant shall not issue, even if it satisfies the criteria
for all three of the standard elements of probable cause, unless it
can be shown that the evidence can not be obtained by less intru-
sive means, e.g., a subpoena duces tecum. The lower court stated
that, "Fourth Amendment considerations compel the following
rule: law enforcement agencies cannot obtain a warrant to con-
duct a third-party search unless the magistrate has probable
cause to believe that a subpoena duces tecum is impractical." 41
In effect, the lower court held that unless some proof can be given
by sworn affidavit to explain why a subpoena should not be uti-
lized, then it must be.
The district court analogized its decision to Bacon v. United
States,42 a Ninth Circuit case involving the arrest of a material
witness to a crime. In Bacon, the court of appeals ruled that a
material witness could not be arrested without a showing of prob-
able cause to believe that it was impracticable to obtain the wit-
ness's presence at a grand jury hearing by subpoena. 43 In
Stanford Daily, the district court argued that analogous to the Ba-
con case, if one cannot be arrested unless there is probable cause
to believe that a subpoena is impractical, then one cannot be
searched unless there is probable cause to believe that a sub-
poena duces tecum is impractical."
In comparison, it should be noted that the district court's appli-
cation of a new requirement for probable cause pertaining to non-
suspect third parties does not conflict with the accepted standard
of probable cause as applied to the Stanford Daily case. If the
state's interest is solely in securing evidence, then there is no
threat to the state's right if it can be shown that the evidence can
40. 353 F. Supp. at 127 (third parties entitled to greater protection particularly
when first amendment interests are involved).
41. Id. at 132.
42. 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971) (challenge to arrest and detention under a ma-
terial witness arrest warrant).
43. Id. at 936. "Bacon argues that the government has no power to assure the
attendance of grand jury witnesses by arrest and detention before disobedience of
a subpoena." Id.
44. 353 F. Supp. at 129-30. The Court believed that unless there is probable
cause to believe a subpoena duces tecum is impractical, a search of a third person
is unreasonable per se.
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be secured through the subpoena process. The lower court's anal-
ysis is simple: if there is no threat to the state's right to secure
the evidence, no search is necessary, and therefore the warrant
may not be authorized.
In some cases, the "subpoena first rule"45 proposed by district
court may prove to be more beneficial to law enforcement officers.
The Stanford Daily search is a case in point. Despite the search
of the newspaper office, no new photos were found.46 However, if
the enforcement officials had waited until that evening when the
Grand Jury was in session,47 a subpoena duces tecum could have
been obtained, and the Stanford Daily would have been forced to
come forward with the evidence or face the legal consequences.
Since no one on the Stanford Daily staff was implicated, there
was no incentive for the Stanford Daily staff to withhold the evi-
dence. It appears that the likelihood of the evidence being ob-
tained through a subpoena process was as good, or greater, than a
search in the first place.
By shunning the lower court's additional requirement for prob-
able cause and opting for a standard which makes no distinction
between suspects and innocent parties, the Supreme Court has
exposed a substantial number of citizens who may have no con-
nection with or knowledge of the commission of a crime to the
possible intrusion of a warranted search. Justice Stevens men-
tioned this in his dissent saying, "Countless law abiding citizens;
doctors, lawyers, merchants, customers, bystanders, may have
documents in their possession that relate to an ongoing criminal
investigation. The consequences of subjecting this large category
of persons to unannounced police searches are extremely
serious."48
In addition to creating a large category of individuals who are
susceptible to the issuance of a search warrant, these third par-
ties also have limited redress from an unjust search. Since the in-
45. Id. at 130. "[TJhe court believes that in all but a few instances a subpoena
duces tecum is the proper-and required-method of obtaining material from a
third party." Id.
46. See note 25 supra.
47. 353 F. Supp. at 127. "[T]he Santa Clara County Clerk's records shows that
the Santa Clara County Grand Jury-a body before which a subpoena duces te-
cum is returnable-met on Monday, April 12, 1971, at 7:30 p.m., two hours after the
warrant executed. (Actually, the records reveal that the Grand Jury met at six
o'clock P.M. to discuss administrative matters)." Id.
48. 436 U.S. at 579.
dividuals who possess the evidence are third parties, they have
no redress through the utilization of the exclusionary rule. Third
parties do not have the protection or deterrent of the exclusionary
rule, because since the evidence is not to be used against them,
they have no grounds for the suppression of evidence in court.49
In addition to the inability of third parties to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule, third parties are also susceptible to the abuse of the
warrant procedure. Due to the ex parte nature of a search war-
rant, there is no adversarial input that a subpoena duces tecum
would assure.5 0 A third party has no opportunity to challenge the
search warrant prior to the intrusion, whereas one can always
move to quash the subpoena before producing the sought-after
materials. When a warrant is employed the possibility of any ef-
fective intervention or objection by the affected citizen is nil; only
ex post facto remedies are available.
Public and media response to the Court's unwillingness to ac-
cept a modified standard for third parties was immediate.5 1 Edi-
torials criticizing the decision as a threat to individual privacy and
freedom of the press appeared in papers across the country. In
the June 2, 1978 Los Angeles Times, an editorial charged, "The
U.S. Supreme Court has taken a narrow, crabbed, suspicious view
of the First Amendment and has given exuberant, indulgent and
trustful approval to a sharp extension of police power." On June
4, 1978, the Washington Post called for immediate remedial legis-
lation; and on June 2,1978, Howard K. Smith of ABC News called
the decision, "the worst, most dangerous ruling the Court has
made in memory."5 2 In the Statement of the Reporters Commit-
tee for Freedom of the Press, delivered by Jack C. Landau, before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, July 13, 1978, the Stanford Daily decision was ac-
cused of granting "a police power alien to our whole concept of a
free society. Modification or limitations on this ruling are not
enough. It must be excised from our law, root and branch."53
Congressional reaction to the Stanford Daily decision was also
49. 353 F. Supp. at 132. "Unlike one suspected of a crime the third party has
no meaningful remedy or protection against an unlawful search ... ." Id.
50. 436 U.S. at 576. (Stewart, J., dissenting). 'There is no opportunity to chal-
lenge the necessity for the search until after it has occurred and the constitutional
protection of the newspaper has been irretrievably invaded." Id.
51. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Hearings on H.R. 3486 and H.R. 4181 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, of the
Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., app. D (1979) (summarization of
statements of leading media figures and editorial reaction to Stanford Daily rul-
ing) (hereinafter cited as Stanford Daily Hearings).
52. See Privacy, supra note 10, at 136. (testimony of Jack Landau referring to
statements of Howard K. Smith).
53. Id. at 137.
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immediate. Bills were spontaneously introduced, and hearings
were held in both the House and the Senate within weeks.54 A
perusal of the remedial legislation introduced 55 conveys that the
intention of Stanford Daily legislation was to supercede the mini-
mum standard for probable cause cited by the Supreme Court. In
effect, Congress chose to implement the "subpoena first" require-
ment as enunciated by the district court.
III. CONGRESSIONAL REMEDIAL LEGISLATION
When legislators decided to respond to the Stanford Daily deci-
sion with the introduction of remedial legislation, the content of
the bills tended to focus on variations of two approaches: (1)
whether the legislation should pertain only to federal agencies, or
encompass state and local law enforcement officials as well;5 6 and
(2) whether the proposed vehicle of enforcement, the "subpoena
first rule,"5 7 should apply specifically to the protection of newspa-
per and media offices, or to all third parties.
In preparing legislation, legislators found themselves con-
fronted with a dilemma between underinclusiveness or over-
breadth. Underinclusiveness results in the denial of protection to
those who justifiably deserve it. On the other hand, overbreadth
places too great a restriction on law enforcement officials, which
may discourage desirable investigations or, alternatively, en-
courage widespread evasion of the rules.5 8 Legislative prefer-
ences for varying degrees of balance between underinclusiveness
or overbreadth resulted in remedial legislation of two types:
"Work Product" and "Third Party" Bills.59
54. The House Subcommittee on Courts Civil Liberties, and the Administra-
tion of Justice held hearings on June 26, 1978; Subcommittee on the Constitution
held hearings on June 22. See Stanford Daily Hearings supra note 51 and Privacy
supra note 10 for references to bills proposed in response to the Stanford Daily
decision.
55. For a complete listing see note 11 supra.
56. See Stanford Daily Hearings, supra note 51. See also Privacy supra note
10, at 137. (Statements of Jack Landau).
57. This rule is essentially equivalent to the subpoena first policy introduced
by the lower courts. 353 F. Supp. 124. See also note 40 supra.
58. For a more elaborate discussion of this dichotomy see Note, supra note 11,
at 165.
59. Id. (specific discussion of differences between the two types of
legislation).
A. "Work Product" v. "Third Party" Bills
The work product bills focused on shielding sources of public
information dissemination. In practical application these bills
were intended to be narrow in scope and only protect persons
who were affiliated with the preparation of or who participated in
newsgathering activities. 60
Congressional authority to enact work product bills on a state
and local level was based upon the Commerce Clause.6 1 The
press, through its daily delivery, involves and effects interstate
commerce as does radio and television with their signals crossing
state lines. 62
Third party bills focused on shielding all innocent third par-
ties. 63 They did not differentiate between work product and non-
work product evidence. Third party legislation required that the
"subpoena first rule" be employed in all instances. Due to the
breadth of coverage furnished by third party bills, they did not
satisfy the requisite of "affecting interstate commerce" suffi-
ciently to base congressional authority to legislate on state and lo-
cal levels on the Commerce Clause. Therefore, third party bills
relied on the congressional authority accorded by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the fourteenth amendment specifically,
Section 5, which grants Congress the power to enforce the provi-
sions of the amendment "by appropriate legislation."6 4
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment permits Congress to en-
act "appropriate legislation" to enforce protections afforded all
Americans by the Bill of Rights. However, whether Congress has
the authority to dictate a new requirement for probable cause, by
incorporating fourth amendment rights through its ability to en-
force the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the four-
teenth amendment, was the subject of controversial debate.65 In
60. See note 14 supra. In particular note the announcement of intent to intro-
duce legislation in response to the Stanford Daily decision which would restrict
police intrusion into news media offices.
61. See note 20 supra.
62. See note 91 infra and accompanying text. "They amount to commercial in-
tercourse, and such intercourse is commerce within the meaning of the constitu-
tion." Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128 (1937).
63. See, Report of the Republican Task Force on the Stanford Daily decision,
Rep. Harold J. Sawyer, Chairman, Thurs. Aug. 17, 1978. See also note 12 supra.
64. See note 17 supra.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 'The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. Const. amend. XIv, § 5.
65. See Stanford Daily Hearings, supra note 51, at 63.
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short, for purposes of Stanford Daily legislation, it is the four-
teenth amendment by which the Bill of Rights has been made ap-
plicable to the states that is critical.66
Recent Supreme Court rulings on congressional authority to ex-
ercise Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to legislate on the
state and local level were fragmented and indeterminate. 67
Therefore, although the majority of the bills introduced were
third party bills that applied on state and local levels, there was
speculation that their constitutionality might not be accepted by
the Court.
Another impediment to third party legislation was that the
Carter Administration favored a work product bill.68 Shortly fol-
lowing the Stanford Daily decision, President Carter asked Attor-
ney General Griffin B. Bell to create a special task force within
the Department of Justice to study the issue of media searches.
This task force, which involved representatives from throughout
the Department, was chaired by Philip B. Heymann, the head of
the criminal division. The task force produced an extensive re-
port accompanied by recommendations for legislation.69 As part
of the background research for the task force report, Philip Hey-
mann canvassed the ninety-four United States Attorneys for their
opinions concerning third party legislation.70 Out of the seventy
Viewed in this way, section five of the fourteenth amendment, is just like
all the other grants of power to Congress. It authorizes Congress to adopt
statutes that Congress regards as "necessary and proper" means for pro-
tecting the rights guaranteed by the first section of that amendment...
the bill is obviously within Congress' power to enact.
Id. (statement of Mark Tushnet).
66. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (the fourteenth amendment did
not require states to lower their voting age from 21 to 18 in state elections); Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (the fourteenth amendment does not insure that
a colored man must have a jury box comprised in part by colored men).
67. See, e.g., 400 U.S. 112 (five separate opinions were filed as the court ruled
on four separate issues). See generally, Stanford Daily Hearings, supra note 51
and Privacy, supra note 10.
68. See note 14 supra. "I will soon propose legislation that would restrict po-
lice intrusion into news media offices, and would give members of the press notice
and an opportunity to challenge requests for the products of their reporting work."
Id.
69. See Stanford Daily Hearings, supra note 51, at 10. "This legislation is enti-
tled the 'First Amendment Privacy Protection Act' because it provides broad pro-
tection against searches for materials which are obtained or prepared in
connection with First Amendment activities." Id.
70. Virtually all U.S. Attorneys strongly agree with that aspect of the Zurcher
decision which concerns third party searches. 'Corrective' legislation is consid-
ered unnecessary, since the U.S. Attorneys know of no empirical proof of abuse
responses received, sixty-six of the Attorneys opposed such legis-
lation. Two felt any difficulties such legislation might create to be
unknown and gave no opinion for or against. Two districts stated
that they would have no problems with the legislation.7 1 Heeding
the opinion of the U.S. Attorneys, the Justice Department per-
ceived third party legislation as another restraint on law enforce-
ment officials, however one which failed to cure any widespread
wrong or injustice. Also, the Justice Department expressed ap-
prehension that extending restrictions on searches to all persons
not suspected of involvement in the crime under investigation
might encourage criminal suspects to conceal evidence in the
"sanctuaries" of third parties. 72 This concern stemmed from the
possibility that some third parties, who may or may not be in-
volved in the crime, may be sympathetic or closely related to the
criminal suspect and hence may impede the efforts of law
encforcement officers to obtain necessary evidence. For the afore-
mentioned reasons, the Justice Department chose to support a
work product bill.73
After consideration of the Justice Department's proposal for a
work product bill, President Carter recommended H.R. 3486, the
First Amendment Privacy Protection Act of 1979. The bill was in-
troduced by Congressman Kastenmeier and referred to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. As introduced, the bill protected third
parties from arbitrary searches only where first amendment inter-
ests are involved. 74 However, members of the Committee ques-
and view existing safeguards as adequate. New legislation is perceived as another
restraint on law enforcement officials, yet one which fails to cure any widespread
wrong or injustice. See Privacy, supra note 10, at 348.
71. Id. at 346-47. The last four United States Attorneys noted no previous use
of third party warrants. The others listed four main reasons for their opposition.
A) Lack of abuse-U.S. Attorneys knew of no federal cases citing
abuse of third party warrants.
B) Delay-Although the use of the warrant is infrequent there is usu-
ally one pressing and immediate reason for their request.
C) The generation of new litigation-It will add one more ground for
defendants to challenge the government.
D) Loss of evidence-Notice requirements will allow more time for de-
struction of evidence.
72. See Privacy, supra note 10, at 344.
73. The protected category of work product materials would consist of any
documentary materials created by or for an individual in connection with
his or her plans to publish .... [This] would be subject to only two nar-
row exceptions. First, a search warrant would be permitted where there is
an immediate danger to life or serious bodily injury. Second, a search
would also be permitted where the individual is a suspect in the crime for
which the evidence is sought.
Id. at 349.
74. "[I] t shall be unlawful for a government officer or employee ... to search
for or seize any work product material possessed by a person reasonably believed
to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or
other similar form of public communication." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1411, 96th
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tioned the underinclusiveness of the bill when every witness in
favor of the legislation testified that the protections of the bill
should not be limited to the press alone.7 5 Committee members
expressed apprehension about singling out the press for special
treatment. As a result, when the subcommittee met for mark up,
it was generally agreed that the legislation should be extended to
apply to all innocent third parties.
Although the Committee favored legislation to protect third par-
ties, they were confronted with the questionable constitutionality
of relying on Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to grant
them the congressional authority to restrict the police powers of
state and local officers. To avoid this constitutional question, the
subcommittee decided to limit the applicability of the broad third
party provisions of the bill to searches by federal officials only.
The opinion expressed was the hope that state legislators would
follow suit.7 6
Senate Bill 1790 was introduced by Senator Birch Bayh as the
companion bill to H.R. 3486. 77 S1790 was also a work product bill.
However, third party considerations were taken into account.
Similar to the House Hearings, every witness (with the exception
of the Department of Justice) who testified in favor of the legisla-
tion stated that the protections of the bill should not be limited to
the press. 78 Senate committee members found themselves in a
situation similar to that of their colleagues in the House. They fa-
vored protecting confidential third party relationships, e.g., doc-
tor/patient, lawyer/client, but had qualms about the
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3872. (hereinaf-
ter H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1411).
75. See Stanford Daily Hearings, supra note 51, at 55 (statement of John Shat-
tuck). "The Justice Department's bill is an imaginative one in that it attempts to
define and protect first amendment materials. But we are very disappointed that
it is as limited as it is, and pleased that the other bills referred to in my testimony
... are broader." S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 8, reprinted at 3955.
76. See S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 9, reprinted at 3956. "The committee
hopes that state legislatures will look toward S. 1790 as a model and draft their
own legitimate responses to Stanford Daily." Id.
77. S. 1790, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) 126 CONG. REC. 13187 (1979).
78. See S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 8, reprinted at 3955,
With the exception of the Department of Justice, not a single witness in
favor of the legislation testified that the protections of the bill should be
limited to the press alone. In fact, the representatives of new organiza-
tions were among the strongest proponents of expanding the legislation to
protect all innocent third parties from arbitrary search and seizure, ex-
pressing concern about singling out the press for special treatment.
Id.
constitutional ability to do so on state and local levels. 79 S1790
took two approaches for the protection of third parties. Besides
applying the "subpoena first rule" to third party searches, S1790
also decreed a congressional mandate for the Attorney General to
develop guidelines which "will be based on the overall philosophy
of this legislation." 80 Hence, the Senate bill incorporated an at-
tempt to provide additional third party protections at a later date.
Although H.R. 3486 and S1790 were companion bills in that they
embodied congruent work product structures, the two bills failed
to receive harmonious acceptance. The House amendment struck
out all of the Senate bill after the enacting clause and inserted a
substitute text. The Senate declined to accept the House amend-
ment and the two bills were dispatched to a Conference
Committee.81
In conference, the Senate receded from its disagreement to the
amendment of the House by supplanting an amendment which
was a substitute for the Senate bill and House amendment. The
differences between the Senate bill, the House amendment, and
the substitute agreed to were several. Inter alia, the title was
changed to delete the phrase "engaged in first amendment activi-
ties." This was done due to the ambiguous meaning of "first
amendment activities" and the inclusion of guidelines in the bill
recognizing the privacy interests of non-suspect third parties.
Also, the "Documentary Materials" definition was expanded to in-
clude mechanically, magnetically, or electronically recorded
cards, tapes, or disks. In addition, Attorney General guidelines
were specifically enumerated and a "Date of Enactment Clause"
was included. The date of enactment was to be January 1, 1981,
with the provisions applicable to state and local governments to
79. See S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 18, reprinted at 3964. "As originally
drafted, S. 1790 supplied such statutory protections from actions by state, local,
and federal government authorities. Serious constitutional and policy questions
about congressional authority to impose law enforcement procedures on the states
remained unresolved, however." Id.
80. S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 18-19, reprinted at 3964-65.
Three standards must be incorporated into the guidelines:
(1) a recognition of the personal privacy interest of the person pos-
sessing the materials sought;
(2) the least intrusive means of obtaining the materials should be em-
ployed, which does not substantially jeopardize the availability or useful-
ness of the materials sought;
(3) a recognition of special concern for the privacy interests repre-
sented in a known, professional confidential relationship.
81. These remarks are substantiated in the legislative histories of the follow-
ing: S. 1790, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 10739 (1980) (amended and
passed Senate); S. 1790, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 CONG. REC. 9355 (1980). (Senate
agreed to conference report); H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 CONG. REC. 9355
(1980) (amended and passed House); H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 CONG.
REc. 10411 (1980) (House agreed to conference report).
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become effective one year after the date of enactment.82
The progression of Congressional Bills H.R. 3486 and S1790 in
response to the Stanford Daily decision was a long arduous path.
Many complicated issues were involved. Also, the decisions were
interrelated, with the repercussions of one decision affecting the
outcome of another. For example, it is helpful to place the vari-
ous alternatives for legislation on intersecting perpendicular
lines. First, there are the horizontal coverage questions. What
third parties should be protected-the press, or all third parties?
Secondly, there are the vertical application questions. Should the
legislation apply solely to federal officers, or should it apply to
state and local enforcement officers as well?83
Eventually, through the compromise of the legislative process, a
bill emerged from the Conference Committee on H.R. 3486 and
S1790. This bill was an amalgamation of work product and third
party bills and was titled '"The Privacy Protection Act of 1980."84
The legislation was signed into law by President Carter on Octo-
ber 13, 1980.85 On the horizontal level, the Privacy Protection Act
is a "work product" bill. However, work product has been broadly
defined 86 and, as such, many individuals only minimumly associ-
ated with information (e.g., authors) are protected. On the verti-
cal axis, the Privacy Protection Act applies to federal, state, and
local authorities, insofar as the protection of "work product" is in-
82. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1411, supra note 74, at 5, 8, reprinted at 3974. A
fourth standard was to be incorporated into the guidelines to be developed by the
Attorney General. The fourth standard is "a requirement that an application for a
warrant . . . be approved by an attorney for the government, except ... in an
emergency situation." Id. at 5.
83. See Stanford Daily Hearings, supra note 51, at 70. (Elaborations of this
horizontal/vertical analysis by Chairman Kastenmeier).
84. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980).
85. See, 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2217 (Oct. 13, 1980).
86. See note 119 infra.
[M] aterials, other than contraband or the fruits of a crime or things other-
wise criminally possessed, or property designed or intended for use, or
which is or has been used, as the means of communicating a criminal of-
fense, and
1) in anticipation of communicating such materials to the public, are pre-
pared, produced, authored, or created, whether by the person in posses-
sion of the materials or by any other person;
2) are possessed for the purposes of communicating such materials to
the public; and
3) include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of the
person who prepared, produced, authored, or created such material.
Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879, 1881 (1980).
volved.87 However, the Privacy Protection Act also protects third
parties not associated with work product such as doctor/patient
or lawyer/client relationships by obliging stringent subpoena first
requirements to be placed on federal officials through mandated
Attorney General guidelines.88 In short, like many pieces of legis-
lation, the Privacy Protection Act is a bill that has tried to ap-
pease the competing interests of effective law enforcement and
individual privacy through balancing and compromise. Balancing
has created a bill that is neither underinclusive or overbroad, but
due to lack of specificity, it may be found that the vagueness that
enables the bill to placate all parties makes the Privacy Protec-
tion Act difficult for the average police officer to understand and
implement.89
IV. THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1980
Before considering the actual application of the Privacy Protec-
tion Act, the first deliberation should be the constitutional foun-
dation that the Act is based upon. From the discussion at the
Congressional Hearings, it is clear that both the legislators and
the Carter Administration intended the authority to be based on
the Commerce Clause.90
A. Federal Authority to Regulate States through Commerce
Clause
A strong case can be made for congressional enactment pursu-
ant to its commerce powers, and no strong constitutional counter-
arguments exists. The press, through its daily delivery, engages
in interstate commerce and affects interstate commerce, as do ra-
dio and television with their signals continually crossing state
lines. Therefore, press and media organizations definitely fall
87. "[Iinsofar as such provisions are applicable to a state or any governmental
unit other than the United States, the provisions of this title shall become effective
one year from the date of enactment of this Act." Privacy Protection Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-40, 94 Stat. 1879, 1882 (1980).
88. Id. See notes 80 and 82 supra for the contents of these guidelines.
89. Use of the concept "work product" places an impossible burden on investi-
gating law enforcement officials .... Thus, before a law enforcement official may
execute any third party search warrant, this legislation in effect requires that he
know the identity of the possessor of the evidence and the intent or the purpose
for which the person possess the evidence. Stanford Daily Hearings, supra note
51, at 171.
90. See S. REP. No. 874 supra note 13, at 9, reprinted at 3955. "The title applies
to state, local and federal law enforcement officers. Because disseminating infor-
mation regularly affects interstate commerce, congressional authority to regulate
state and local enforcement in this statute is based on the commerce clause, U.S.
Const. Art. I, Sec. 8." Id.
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within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause.91 Pe-
riodicals and the pamphlet-leaflet press are in commerce either
because they are sent across state lines by mail or other means or
because they affect commerce in a variety of ways such as the
purchase of goods that have passed in interstate commerce.
Thus, they also may be protected through the utilization of the
Commerce Clause.92
The Commerce Clause received a broad, expansive reading
from Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,93 the first case
considering it. The Court's interpretation was that the word
"commerce" is not restricted "to traffic, to buying and selling, or
the interchange of commodities." Rather, commerce is "inter-
course." Commerce "describes the commercial intercourse be-
tween nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches." 94 The
commerce Justice Marshall referred to was the interaction
"among" the several states.
However, the Commerce Clause was not interpreted to be with-
out congressional boundaries.
It [the Commerce Clause] may very properly be restricted to that com-
merce which concerns more states than one .... The genius and charac-
ter of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to
all the ... internal concerns [of the nation] which affect the states gener-
ally; but not to those which are completely within a particular state, which
do not affect other states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere,
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of thegovernment.9 5
91. See Fed. Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266 (1932); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1936); United States v. S.E. Un-
derwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 549 (1944). "Not only, then, may transactions be
commerce though non-commercial; they may be commerce though illegal and spo-
radic, and though they do not utilize common carriers or concern the flow of any-
thing more tangible than elections and information." 322 U.S. at 549-50. 289 U.S.
266 (congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce should not be abro-
gated by existing arrangements which would conflict with the execution of its pol-
icy); 301 U.S. 103 (Interstate communication of a business nature, whatever the
means employed, is interstate commerce subject to regulation by Congress).
92. Scarborough v. United States 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (the Commerce Clause
will have effect where the items in question may have traveled interstate at one
time or when the thing in question affects interstate commerce and there is little
concern for the time at which the nexus with commerce took place).
93. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
94. Id. at 189-90. New York state had granted an exclusive right to navigate its
waters to two private individuals. Gibbons held this to be repugnant to the Com-
merce Clause, since commerce, which includes all commercial intercourse be-
tween nations, and parts thereof, in all its branches, also includes navigation.
95. Id. at 194-95.
All forms of interstate transportation come within the Com-
merce Clause. Once there is a movement across a state line, the
movement itself, the transactions which gave rise to it, and per-
sons engaged in both the movement and the transaction are sub-
ject to the commerce power. Furthermore, the Court has held
that the movement or transactions that cross state lines may be
minuscule in proportion to the movement and transactions that
occur within state boundaries and still be regulated by the Com-
merce Clause. For example, a newspaper published may dis-
tribute less than 1% of their daily copies across state lines and
still be subject to the Commerce Clause.96
If the requisite nexus for interstate movement has been met,
the Court has also held that the congressional power to regulate,
once a passage across state lines has taken place, continues for a
lengthy time after the cessation of movement. In United States v.
Sullivan,97 the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for violation
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Congres-
sional authority to enforce the regulations of the Act upon the
states was based on the Commerce Clause. The Court held in
Sullivan that despite the fact that the drugs in question had
crossed interstate lines a full six months before the infraction,
Congress still had the power to regulate them through enforce-
ment of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.98
Although the Court has given ait expansive reading to the Com-
merce Clause in such cases as Sullivan, congressional authority
has been restrained from application in circumstances which in-
volve no interstate connection. In U.S. v. Five Gambling De-
vices,99 the Court held: "No precedent of this Court sustains the
power of Congress to enact legislation penalizing failure to report
information concerning acts not shown to be in, or mingled with,
or found to affect commerce."1 00
However, even though the Court has refused to allow Congress
to legislate without an interstate connection, the Court has per-
96. Mabee v. White Plains Publ. Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946). Although approxi-
mately one-half of one percent of the publisher's daily newspaper circulation,
which ranged between 9,000-11,000 copies, traveled across state lines it was still
ruled as sufficient to bring him within the ambit of the commerce clause.
97. 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
98. Id. at 696. But the language used by Congress broadly and unqualifiedly
prohibits misbrandng articles held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce,
without regard to how long after the shipment the misbranding occurred, how
many interstate sales had intervened, or who had received the articles at the end
of the interstate shipment.
99. 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
100. Id. at 446. This appears to be a strict interpretation of the Commerce
Clause wherein the Court in this case refused to look beyond the assertions made
by the government.
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mitted Congress to regulate purely local commerce affected by an
interstate connection. If, in order to effectively implement its au-
thority to regulate commerce, Congress must regulate purely lo-
cal interests, it may do so.
The power of Congress... extends to those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it
as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.
United States v. Darby.Ol In Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v.
United States,0 2 the Court once again upheld congressional au-
thority to regulate purely local interests. Upholding federal regu-
lations including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court, in
Katzenbach v. McClung,l0 3 said:
Much is said about a... business being local but 'even if appellee's activ-
ity be local and though it may be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial eco-
nomic effect on interstate commerce. ' 1
The power of Congress to promote interstate commerce may
base its congressional authority to enact the Privacy Protection
Act on the commerce clause: 1) the right to regulate commerce
associated with the transmission and dissemination of informa-
tion continually across state lines; 2) the right to regulate com-
merce associated with the purchase of materials which
continually cross state lines---even if the final product does not,
e.g., production of a pamphlet or leaflet; 3) the right to regulate
purely local interests if local interests threaten to affect inter-
state commerce.
Inasmuch as these positive grants of power do exist, it must
also be noted that a recent Supreme Court case, National League
of Cities v. UserylO5 can be interpreted as a restraint on congres-
sional authority to utilize the Commerce Clause. National League
of Cities v. Usery held that the 1974 Fair Labor Standards Act
amendments, extending existing federal minimum wage and max-
imum hours provisions to state employers, constituted an invalid
use of the Commerce Clause power since they interfered with the
101. 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
102. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
103. 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurant which discriminated against blacks was
barred from doing so as in violation of Commerce Clause because substantial por-
tion of food served was transported interstate thus considered a burden on inter-
state commerce).
104. 379 U.S. 294, 302, citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
105. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
states' right to control their governmental functions.106
The decision of the Court, a five to four judgment written by
Justice Rehnquist, is premised on the lack of authority delegated
to Congress to regulate the employer-employee relationships of
state governments and their subdivisions. Justice Rehnquist did
not restrict his interpretation of congressional restraint to state
employer-employee relationships. Instead, he referred to inter-
governmental immunity. "[TJhere are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired
by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant
of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Con-
stitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
manner."
10 7
Considering the Usery emphasis on the states' sovereign immu-
nity, the conclusion could be drawn that the Privacy Protection
Act's regulation of state and local officers is an unconstitutional
infringement of the states' freedom of structure intergral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions. However,
before this conclusion is adopted, attention should focus on the
dissimilarity between the Privacy Protection Act, applicable to
the states' relationship with private citizens, and the Fair Labor
Standards Actl'0 amendments which applied to the states' inter-
nal relationship with its employees. Justice Rehnquist, in Usery,
noted this disparity between congressional authority directed at
private citizens as opposed to the states' themselves. "It is one
thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulat-
ing individual business .... It is quite another to uphold a simi-
lar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private
citizens, but to the States as States."10 9 A limitation of Usery to
fact situations where only the internal structures and operations
of state government are involved would be a legitimate applica-
tion. Thus, Usery does not appear to endanger the constitutional-
ity of the Privacy Protection Act.
Since Usery, several cases questioning the constitutionality of
the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968110 have been
heard. Similar to the Privacy Protection Act, the Omnibus Act
106. Id. at 845. A balance was drawn between the authority of Congress to reg-
ulate such conduct, i.e. minimum wages paid, and the competing interests of the
state to be free from unrestrained Federal intervention.
107. Id. at 852. Congress has the authority, via the Commerce Clause, to regu-
late state administrative activities, however for the courts to allow such regulation
would be, in effect, a complete abridgement of inherent state powers. Id. at 845.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1940), as amended by Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259 § 2, 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
109. 426 U.S. at 845.
110. 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 28, 42 and 47 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 9:131, 1981] Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
regulations were imposed upon the states by congressional au-
thority granted by the Commerce Clause.'1 1 In Scarborough v.
United States,112 the principle was whether possession of a fire-
arm by a felon could be regulated due to the previous interstate
travel of the weapon. Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the major-
ity, held that: the congressional intent of Title VII of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was to require not more than
a "minimal nexus";113 that the firearm have been, at some time, in
interstate commerce, and to outlaw possession broadly, with little
concern for when the nexus with commerce occurred. With the
Scarborough decision as precedent following Usery, it could be
argued that analogous to weapons, "work product" is within con-
gressional authority to regulate by the Commerce Clause, be-
cause work product satisfies the same "minimal nexus," "affecting
commerce," "at some time in interstate travel" that weapons do.
In U.S. v. Culbert,114 Justice Marshall, again writing for the ma-
jority, upheld a conviction under the Hobbs Act of 1976.115 The
Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Hobbs Act, which was
also based on congressional authority granted by the Commerce
Clause, thereby overruling the court of appeals decision limiting
the scope of application of the Act. Upholding congressional au-
thority to regulate broadly on the state level by exercising the
Commerce Clause, the court said:
Our examination of the statutory language and the legislative history of
the Hobbs Act impels us to the conclusion that Congress intended to
make criminal all conduct within the reach of the statutory language. We
therefore decline the invitation to limit the statute's scope by reference to
an undefined category of conduct termed "racketeering." 1 16
Considering the Court's willingness to accept the constitutional-
ity of federal regulation on the state level through the Hobbs Act,
111. Id. Wire communications are normally conducted through the use of facil-
ities which form part of an interstate network and therefore affect interstate
commerce.
112. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
113. Id. at 577. Congress was greatly concerned with crimes committed with
dangerous weapons, namely firearms, therefore the requirement that there be a
minimal nexus with interstate commerce was adopted by the Court.
114. 435 U.S. 371 (1978).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1979).
116. 435 U.S. at 380. The lower court limited the application of the Act not upon
Commerce Clause considerations, but upon its interpretation of "racketeering." It
stated that Culbert's cuts were removed from what it, the court, considered as
racketeering therefore not within the scope of the Act-the Supreme Court dis-
agreed and reversed.
it seems likely that the Court will also accept the limited state
regulation of work product embodied in the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980. A comparative analysis on the congressional usage of
the Commerce Clause in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 and the Hobbs Act of 1976 supports the conclu-
sion that, based on precedent, the Court will uphold the federal
authority to regulate the states. 1 7
However, as cases such as Usery clearly demonstrate, although
the courts will uphold the authority of Congress to regulate, there
are restraints on the scope of such legislation.118 In the case of
the Privacy Protection Act, the interpretation of the "work prod-
uct" definition is of extreme importance. The clarification of the
phrase "work product" will determine what the scope of congres-
sional application of the Commerce Clause will be. If work prod-
uct is interpreted to only protect the materials of the press, then
there is little question of its constitutionality. But, if work prod-
uct is interpreted to include authors, leafleters, etc., the constitu-
tional power to regulate the states' conduct towards these
individuals by exercising the Commerce Clause is less clear.
Before the courts may rule upon the constitutionality of the
Act, they will have to interpret who and what materials the terms
"work product"" 9 and "documentary materials"120 actually pro-
tect. Certainly, for guidance in making these interpretations, the
court will review congressional intent.
B. Congressional Intent
When the courts review the congressional intent of the Privacy
Protections Act of 1980 they will find many sources of informa-
tion. 2 1 Since the Stanford Daily decision in 1970, there have
been hearings in both the House and the Senate (as well as an
independent task force) that have delved into the repercussions
of possible remedial solutions to the Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
117. In Stanford Daily, Justice White specifically noted the permissibility of
congressional legislation to place additional requirements upon search warrant
procedure. "Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise against
legislative or executive efforts to establish nonconstitutional protection against
possible abuses of the search warrant procedure." 436 U.S. at 567.
118. See note 107 supra and accompanying text. Congress has no power to
cause a state to place its capital in a certain area within the state.
119. "Work product" is defined in the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980). Section 107(b) of the Act provides: "'Work product'
... encompasses the materials whose very creation arises out of a purpose to con-
vey information to the public."
120. Id. at § 107(a). "'Documentary materials,' .. encompasses the variety of
materials upon which information is recorded." Id.
121. See notes 11, 13, 16, 22, 56, 58, 63, 75, 83 and 85 supra for documents relevant
to congressional intent.
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decision.122 Also, there are House and Senate reports on the Pri-
vacy Protection Act,123 as well as a conference report on the final
bill.124 In short, there should be sufficient chronicles available for
judges to decipher the congressional intent of the legislation.
Furthermore, an objective examination of congressional docu-
ments concerning Stanford Daily reveals that: the legislation in-
volving the Privacy Protection Act, as well as the Act itself,
supports a broad interpretation of the "work product" definitions.
The immediate reactions of legislators to the Stanford Daily de-
cision was to introduce "third party bills."125 Not until constitu-
tional issues arose which questioned the ability of Congress to
legislate on state and local levels to protect all third parties and
the Justice Department supported a "work product" rather than a
"third party" bill did legislators agree to accept the less inclusive
scope of protection embodied in a work product bill.
Throughout the congressional hearings, speakers testified in
favor of protection for all innocent third parties. 26 Although
President Carter and the Justice Department preferred a work
product bill, Mr. Philip Heymann, who testified at the congres-
sional hearings on behalf of the Justice Department, said, "the bill
... is one that broadly covers-it is a first amendment bill, not a
press bill--everyone exercising his first amendment rights."127
122. See Stanford Daily Hearings, supra note 51 and Privacy, supra note 10,
and note 63 supra.
123. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1411, supra note 74, at 1, reprinted at 3972. SENATE
CoNF. REP. No. 1003, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). The House and Senate Reports
give full explanations of the intent of the legislation. For further explanation see
S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 25, reprinted at 3970-71 where the Senators voiced
two concerns about the legislation: first, the final committee's departure from a
mere 'subpoena first' rule with respect to a journalist's 'work product'; secondly,
the bill does not contain an adequate national security exception. See also notes
15 and 75 supra.
124. For further evidence of intent, look to the additions and deletions made to
the legislation by the conference committee. Of particular interest are the revised
definitions of "documentary" and "work product" materials. See note 74 supra,
and SENATE CoNF. REP. No. 1003, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
125. Numerous bills were introduced in the weeks following the Stanford Daily
decision. These bills focused on first amendment considerations as well as protec-
tion of citizens from warrant searches. See generally note 11 supra.
126. See Privacy, supra note 51, at 4. William J. Small, Vice President, CBS
Inc., testified that the need to enact legislation barring police searches of new-
srooms was particularly compelling; see also S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13 at 8,
reprinted at 3955, where it was stated that Title m of the act was designed to ex-
tend protection to all innocent third parties holding documentary evidence.
127. See Privacy, supra note 51, at 19. Mr. Small also testified on the scope of
the legislation. "The legislation is entitled the 'First Amendment Privacy Protec-
When Chairman Kastenmeier requested additional clarification
from Mr. Heymann, the following exchange took place:
Mr. Heymann: For a communication to be covered by the bill, it would
have to be at least available to anyone in the public who wanted ....
The appropriate test for ascertaining whether the communication in ques-
tion is public or not is whether it would be available to persons in the gen-
eral public upon simple request.
Mr. Kastenmeier. Is a public speech a public communication?
Mr. Heymann: A public speech would be a public communication.
Mr. Kastenmeier. I was thinking of, to test the proportion, say we're talk-
ing about a protestor in the streets ....
Mr. Heymann: Yes. There's no reason why a public speech under appro-
priate circumstances of likely impact on interstate commerce wouldn't be
covered.12 8
If, as Mr. Heymann testified, the Justice Department's work
product definition was broad enough to encompass public speak-
ers, then it can be presumed that the work product definition in
the Privacy Protection Act is also intended to be interpreted
broadly. The Privacy Protection Act was actually President
Carter's recommendation for legislation,129 and the President's
legislation incorporated the findings of the Justice Department as
outlined by Mr. Heymann.130
The intention of a broad interpretation of work product was ex-
pressed by President Carter. In his statement accompanying his
signing of the Privacy Protection Act, President Carter com-
mented on his interpretation of work product. 'This bill also cov-
ers others engaged in first amendment activities such as authors
and scholars." In light of the written record of congressional and
Presidential intent, it is undoubtable that the work product defini-
tion in the Privacy Protection Act is intended to be broadly de-
fined. In fact, the wording of the Privacy Protection Act implicitly
requires a broad interpretation of work product. Under Part B-
Remedies, Exceptions, and Definitions, the definition for work
product includes "work product materials, as used in this Act,...
tion Act' because it provides broad protections against searches for materials
which are obtained or prepared in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the
public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communica-
tion." Id. at 4.
128. Id. at 18, 19. Mr. Heymann further testified, "the secret of its capacity to be
so broad, and yet, I think, to be workable, is that it covers only documentary
materials and it protects against search and seizure of only those materials which
are kept for publication in interstate commerce." Id.
129. Chairman Kastenmeier noted during subcommittee hearings that he had
not written the Privacy Protection Act, but had only introduced it. "The bill is es-
sentially a bill written by the Justice Department, which I was pleased, along with
Mr. Railsback, to introduce in their behalf and at their request. It does not repre-
sent a product of our own." Id. at 65.
130. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text. President Carter felt this legis-
lation was, "a major step forward in protecting the integrity of freedom of the
press." Id.
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include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of
the person who prepared, produced, authored, or created such
material."131 Indefinite terms such as "mental impressions" and
"opinions" required a broad interpretation simply because they
cannot be classified.
Although it is clear that the congressional intent is for a broad
application of the work product definition, such an expansive defi-
nition does create several dilemmas concerning the implementa-
tion of the Act. For example, an unspecific work product
definition is likely to present difficulties for the policeman on the
beat or a district attorney trying to deduce exactly who is pro-
tected by "work product" and who is not. Mr. Richard J. Williams,
Vice President of the National District Attorneys Association, tes-
tified in the House hearings that: "Use of the concept work prod-
uct places an impossible burden on investigating law enforcement
officials. Whether evidence is subject to the protections of this
statute depends not so much on objective circumstances as it
does upon the state of mind of the persons possessing the
evidence." 132
Undoubtedly, law enforcement officials will receive guidance
from the courts as to who is protected by the work product defini-
tion. Eventually, there will be appeals for the interpretations of
the courts. These appeals will bring forth a second dilemma re-
sulting from an expansive interpretation of work product. Rough-
ly, the broader the work product definition is applied, the less
constitutional it becomes. Since the congressional authority to
enforce the Privacy Protection Act upon the states stems from the
Commerce Clause, the more localized work product protections
become (e.g., public speakers), the more likely the enforcement
of the Act upon the states will be ruled unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.133 Therefore, a broad interpretation of the work
131. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-440, § 107(b), 94 Stat. 1879,
1881 (1980). Work Product also includes materials used: "(1) in anticipation of
communicating such materials to the public... prepared, produced, authored, or
created, whether by the person in possession of the materials or by a person other
than the person in possession of the materials; (2) . . . for purposes of communi-
cating such materials to the public." Id. See notes 119-20 supra.
132. See Stanford Daily Hearings, supra note 51, at 171. Mr. Williams went on
to state, '"Thus, before a law enforcement official may execute any third party
search warrant, this legislation in effect requires that he know the identity of the
possessor of the evidence and the intent or purpose for which the person pos-
sesses the evidence." Id.
133. This assertion is made in light of the Court's decision in Nat'! League of
product definition may protect a wider range of third parties ini-
tially, but may eventually be overruled.
Although legislators sought to enact a broad "first amendment
bill," they were not without concern for the difficulty law enforce-
ment officials face in obtaining evidence in extenuating circum-
stances. To prevent the Privacy Protection Act from
"hamstringing" officials, the Act includes several exceptions in
which the police are not required to adhere to the "subpoena first
rule."134 Congress has chosen to differentiate between "work
product" and "documentary materials" for the availability of ex-
ceptions to the "subpoena first rule." 3 5 For "work product" the
Privacy Protection Act allows two exceptions where:
(1) there is probable cause to believe that the person possessing such
materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense to
which the materials relate;
(2) there is reason to believe that the immediate seizure of such materi-
als is necessary to prevent the death of, or serious bodily injury to, a
human being.
1 36
Limited to these two exceptions, work product is governed by a
"no search" rule in most circumstances. There is no provision for
a search warrant if a journalist threatens to conceal or destroy
work product materials or if he fails to comply with a subpoena.
The legislative reasoning was that a subject that either destroys
evidence, or withholds information could be punished with crimi-
nal penalties or contempt. 37
Unlike work product, there is not a "no search" rule for docu-
mentary materials. The Privacy Protection Act requires the use
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), wherein the Court held the Commerce Clause
cannot infringe on other parts of or the whole of the Constitution. States have cer-
tain rights and responsibilities which cannot be usurped by the federal govern-
ment. See generally notes 105-07 supra and accompanying text.
134. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879, 1880 (1980).
The purpose of this act is to limit searches for materials held by persons involved
in first amendment activities who are themselves not suspected of participation in
the criminal activity for which the materials are sought, not to limit the ability of
law enforcement officers to search for and seize materials held by those suspected
of committing the crime under investigation. See S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at
10 reprinted at 3956.
135. See S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 10, reprinted at 3956. "Since work
product involves a creative, mental process, it was felt by the Committee that it
was deserving of a higher level of protection than ordinary documentary materi-
als." Id.
136. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980). The
purpose of the "suspect exception" is to prevent possible abuse by law enforce-
ment authorities. The purpose of the second exception, obviously, is to save lives.
No other exceptions are provided for obtaining a search warrant for work product.
See S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 10, 12, reprinted at 3956-58.
137. See S. REP. No. 874, supra note 13, at 12, reprinted at 3958. It was the com-
mittee's belief that the creative process represented in work product is at the
heart of first amendment concerns and that the proper penalty for a journalist
withholding his personal creation lies with the punishment of contempt. Id.
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of a subpoena to obtain documentary materials unless any one of
four exceptions to the rule apply:
(1) and (2) are identical to the work product exceptions;
(3) there is reason to believe that the giving of notice pursuant to a sub-
poena duces tecum would result in the destruction, alteration, or
concealment of such materials;
(4) such materials have not been produced in response to a court order
directing compliance with a subpoena duces tecum, and-
(A) all appellate remedies have been exhausted; or
(B) there is reason to believe that the delay in an investigation or
trial occasioned by further proceedings relating to the sub-
poena would threaten the interests of justice. 1 3 8
A similar quandary exists for the permissibility of exceptions to
that of determining what the breadth of work product coverage
would be. Once again, it will be difficult for the officer or prosecu-
tor to determine whether the evidence sought consists of work
product or documentary materials.139 Also, when'a distinction
has been made, the courts will still have to decide what the crite-
ria for permitting an exception will be.140
Recognizing the indiscriptiveness of definitions and exceptions,
the legislators have mandated in the Privacy Protection Act that
the Attorney General compile a comprehensive set of guidelines
for federal officers within six months after the enactment of the
Act.141 The mandate was specific in that it outlined categories of
third parties that were intended to receive coverage. Then the de-
tail of the composition of these categories was left to the discre-
138. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440 § 107(b), 94 Stat. 1879,
1880. See also H. CoNF. REP. No. 1411, supra note 74, at 7, reprinted at 3971, where
it is noted that documentary materials include mechanically, magnetically, or elec-
tronically recorded cards, tapes, or discs. The report further stated that fies
which contain reporters notes and interviews are considered to be included to the
extent that such files contain protected materials.
139. See Privacy, supra note 10, at 348. Many U.S. attorneys candidly described
the legislation as a gross overreaction to the concerns resulting from the Supreme
Court's decision in the Stanford Daily case. Their greatest concern was that a leg-
islative response to what they perceive as a "non-problem" will, in fact, create
many new problems; there was a feeling that the relying on centralized control by
the Attorney General are an adequate match for the real concerns. Id.
140. This may force the Court into judging interpersonal relationships. E.g.,
tier between family members may become an issue.
141. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440 § 107(b), 94 Stat. 1879,
1882. The House amendment included Attorney General guidelines in a slightly
different form from the Senate bill. The differences in the House amendment in-
cluded the fuller explanation of privacy interests in § 201 and a requirement that a
U.S. Attorney approve an application for a warrant in most cases. See H. CoNF.
REP. No. 1411, mpra note 74, at 8, reprinted at 3972.
tion of the Attorney General. The enumerated mandate in the
Privacy Protection is:
(1) a recognition of the personal privacy interest of the person in posses-
sion of such documentary materials;
(2) a requirement that the least intrusive method or means of obtaining
such materials be used which do not substantially jeopardize the
availability or usefulness of the materials sought to be obtained;
(3) a recognition of special concern for privacy interests in cases in
which a search or seizure for such documents would intrude upon a
known confidential relationship such as that which may exist be-
tween clergyman and parishioner, lawyer and client, or doctors and
patient;
(4) a requirement that an application for a warrant to conduct a search
governed by this title be approved by an attorney for the govern-
ment, except that in an emergency situation the application may be
approved by another appropriate supervisory official if within 24
hours of such emergency the appropriate United States Attorney is
notified.1 42
Furthermore, the Attorney General is required to "collect and
compile information on, and report annually to the Committees
on the Judiciary of the Senate and House of Representatives on
the use of search warrants by Federal officers and employees for
documentary materials."143
With regard to the inclusion of confidential relationships, the in-
tent of Congress to broadly protect confidential relationships has
been documented in the Conference Report, Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference.
The reference to these three relationships [lawyer/client, doctor/patient,
clergyman/parishioner] in the statute is not intended to be an exclusive
reference. Other important confidential relationships such as exist be-
tween psychologist and client, psychiatrist, social worker and client and
psychiatric nurse and client shall be recognized. Further, it is the intent
of Congress that the phrase "doctor/patient" be construed broadly to in-
clude all doctorlike therapeutic relationships.14
In summary, although there may be some debatable constitu-
142. See H. CoNF. REP. No. 1411, supra note 74, at 8, reprinted at 3972. The prin-
cipal exception which would allow the use of a search warrant as opposed to a re-
quest or a subpoena is where there is sufficient reason to believe that the
documentary materials sought would be destroyed if a subpoena were to be is-
sued, or when immediate seizure of the materials is required to prevent substan-
tial reduction in their usefulness. Id.
143. Id. See also Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879,
1882 (1980). This section also provides that non-compliance with the guidelines
would not be litigable, and the evidence obtained through a violation would not be
subject to the exclusionary rule, and that the federal courts would be without ju-
risdiction over any claim based solely on a failure to follow such guidelines. Id. at
1883.
144. See H. CoNF. REP. No. 1411, supra note 74, at 9, reprinted at 3972. "Testi-
mony on Standard [sic] Daily legislation before the committee convinced the
members of the extreme sensitivity of the relationship, for example, between a
psychiatrist and his or her patient, and the harm which can be done by an intru-
sive governmental seizure of confidential information, and police rummaging
through confidential files." Id.
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tional ramifications, the congressional intent clearly was to re-
strict a wide variety of third party searches through the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980.
CONCLUSION
As the description of the progression of legislation throughout
this comment recounts, there has been a long arduous procession
which has finally concluded with the Privacy Protection Act of
1980, a process spanning a decade.145 But the controversy, re-
sponse, testimony, and remedies stemming from the Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily decision are far from finished.
The Privacy Protection Act does currently protect some ele-
ments of "work product" and "documentary materials," but who
is actually protected is still relatively unclear. Legislators have
carefully documented their intent to broadly protect innocent
third parties by the "work product" definition. And, although con-
stitutional issues do arise, a strong argument can be made for
congressional authority to regulate the states through the Com-
merce Clause.
Although the intent for the implementation of the Act is rela-
tively clear, the recent change in Administration leaves questions
as to whether this intent will be accepted and followed.l4 6 Like a
painting left unfinished by the original artist, the Privacy Protec-
tion Act is far from complete. With a new artist now at the easel,
the press, the media, and any potential third party, must await
the finishing strokes.
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145. The initial search of the Daily office took place on April 12, 1971.
146. Attorney General Griffin B. Bell had responsibility for much of the devel-
opment of remedial legislation to the Stanford Daily decision. He has since been
succeeded by Attorney General William French Smith.
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